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ment, perchance, or the world of feeling? Doubtless these are structural neighbors of cognition in certain series.¹⁰

But it must be noted that this 'world beyond' is not a fixed order: these kinds of experience seem to a certain extent to play the rôle of world beyond *for each other*, so that cognitive experience is known by value experience, and value experience in turn by cognition. This suggestion receives some color from the apparent need of explaining the norms of cognition, if at all, by the norms of action (pragmatism, action theory, etc.), and the ethical 'ought' by an 'is.'

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ANDOVER.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LOGICAL JUDGMENT WITH REFERENCE TO REALISM

IN various quarters there has lately been a renaissance of 'realism' so called. Mr. G. E. Moore's realism of concepts is made the epistemological basis of Mr. B. Russell's imposing work 'The Principles of Mathematics,' and it finds an answering echo in this country. Professor Woodbridge proclaims himself a realist and asserts that the addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is simply an addition to it and not a transformation of it. Dr. Montague tells us that consciousness is simply a relation between things, but does not tell what is the *differentia* of this peculiar relation by which things get a cognitive consciousness added to them. Presumably things would be just the same without consciousness and, if so, why and how does this peculiar relation called consciousness get superimposed on reality? How does consciousness get born into a world that would perhaps get along better without this disturbing factor which can not seem to rid itself of the illusion that it too has a determinate reality? Again we seem to have another variant of realism in the 'immediate' empiricism of Professors Dewey and James, who agree in eliminating the transcendent reference from cognition.

I confess at the outset that I have not been able to make out just what these various writers mean by realism. For Professor Woodbridge and Dr. Montague cognitive thought seems to be an epiphenomenon; for Professors Dewey and James, a single phase of immediate psychic process on a level with all other psychic processes.

¹⁰ It is worth while observing that the fact that an object is known never as a species, but always as an individual, plays a rôle in the knowing of knowing different from the rôle it plays in the knowing of anything else; knowing is known *always in particular acts, and it is known first as physical knowledge*. Knowledge of the last attained degree of reflection can not, in the nature of the case, be known and reckoned with the species.

Now, the Platonic view aside, realism in *epistemology* means that human thought somehow gets into right relation with reality, whereas realism in *metaphysics* means that the real is wholly external to and independent of thought. And in recent discussions one seems to find a confused shifting from one to the other of these uses of the terms. I suppose we are all realists in the sense of holding that cognitive thinking is not shut up with itself as a psychical process, but is in contact with a real world. But if it be maintained that there is a real world entirely independent of thought which may be passively mirrored or represented in thought, but which in itself goes on entirely irrespective of whether thought is at work in it, I find such a notion contradictory to the very notion of cognitive consciousness. For in such case thought is an otiose excrescence in a world which would still be the same without it. In such case cognitive consciousness must be an unaccountable by-product of the cosmic machinery. This sort of metaphysical realism strikes me as a violent attempt to get out of an *impasse* created by a confusion of the psychological and the logical treatments of cognition. It is, therefore, perhaps opportune to reiterate some truisms on this point.

Judgment is the fundamental *act* of thought, and a right notion of the nature and function of judgment is indispensable to an adequate conception of the logical function and ultimate position of thought with reference to reality. I, therefore, propose to start from the definition of judgment as the reference of an idea to reality, or the 'intellectual function which defines reality by significant ideas,'¹ and to show that the assumption of a reality entirely independent of thought has its roots in a fallacious conception of thought.

In the definition of judgment as the reference of an idea to reality, 'idea' is used not in the psychological sense of a mere mental existent, but as *meaning*. We must be on our guard against confusing these two uses of 'idea.' Even Mr. Bradley seems to drop back into the psychological mode of treatment when he says, "A meaning consists of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind and considered apart from the existence of the sign."² To speak thus as if reasoning and judgment were static, psychologically given contents, is to obscure the true bearings of a conception of judgment that is in itself entirely adequate. I prefer to say simply that it is the 'meaning' of an idea that refers to reality and that meaning is dynamic, a matter of active tendency and direction. In cognitive thinking judgment is the *act* of cognitive reference to reality, and hence not to be regarded as in any sense a psychological

¹ Bosanquet, 'Logic,' Vol. I., p. 104.

² 'Principles of Logic,' p. 4.

content. Let us consider for a moment the distinction between the psychological and the logical points of view.

It is necessary for the descriptive analysis of psychology that conscious process be regarded as having separate and independent existence sundered from the world of social and physical existence. This sundering of consciousness from its world-context is absolutely indispensable to the work of exact analysis. Analytic psychology treats the individual consciousness as if it flowed on independent of anything else. This artificial isolation is applied alike to the mental processes which have cognitive, esthetic or ethical reference. Now if the logician or epistemologist sets out from this standpoint of psychological abstraction he will never find a clear or straight road back to the real world with which consciousness as cognitive deals. The reference of thought to reality in the act of judgment is at some point an *immediate reference* or it is no reference at all. Thought for logic is primarily and fundamentally thought-referring-to-an-existent-order, not thought as idea simply entertained in somebody's head. Nothing but confusion can result if the logical and epistemological consideration of thought set out by sundering, in the fashion of psychological analysis, thought from its object of reference. It is this initial error in the treatment of judgment that makes plausible the recent 'realisms' which maintain that thought makes no sort of difference to the existence and reality of outer things, and that even the abstract propositions of mathematics must be entities existing independently of any knowing mind. Truly, if judgment be primarily a conscious process having mere psychical existence in individual heads, if cognition consists in the entertaining of ideas by a consciousness sundered from the universe of things, then thought is but the passive reflector of a world of entirely independent entities. In this case thought may in some mysterious fashion represent things, but it does nothing. It makes no difference to reality. There is, then, no way of bridging the chasm from the thought-side to the real world outside, and our so-called universal truths—those of logic and pure mathematics—either are mere individual psychic existents like any other content of consciousness or they have a mysterious existence as independent entities. (Analogous problems arise in regard to the concepts of ethics and esthetics when these two are treated in psychological fashion as mere contents of consciousness. Duty, goodness and beauty are then either purely subjective or they are independent entities.)

I should be the last to deny that we may derive aid in the development of a logical theory of cognition from psychological analysis. But we shall surely be led astray unless we bear in mind that thought in its actual functioning as instrument of cognition is

an act of immediate and indivisible reference to reality. And, on the other hand, if we keep in mind that judgment as the immediate reference of a meaning to reality is the act of a moving or fluid mind in relation to an environment only relatively stable. We shall be able to understand why logical thinking, too, undergoes an evolution, and we need not be greatly troubled by the problem of erroneous judgment. An erroneous judgment is a reference to reality, erroneous either because the mind in making this reference has not taken sufficiently into account the systematic context of its immediate meaning or because meanwhile the real context has shifted in some respect. The failure of the immediate meaning can only be discovered by an actual reference of it to reality; and the test consists in trying to fit the particular judgment into a more or less connected system of judgments that have proved themselves workable and consistent.

The objection to the above conception of judgment from the existence of such judgments, as a 'centaur has the lower body of a horse and the head and shoulders of a man,' rests on a confusion. The above proposition is a judgment with reference to a mythological universe 'of discourse,' which again is related to the real world through the implied assertion of the real existence of men and horses. All false ideas and erroneous judgments have psychical existence, and the assertion of their existence is a true judgment since it refers to reality in which every individual mind has a place. Again, the judgment, 'there is truth,' is the assertion that what is meant or signified by 'truth' is involved in the world of fact or reality. (I should say that the judgment, 'truth exists,' is badly put, and that it is better to differentiate truth's actuality from the actuality of other things by saying 'truth is valid' or 'knowledge *means* or *signifies* reality.') A serious difficulty seems to arise from the case of mathematical and logical judgments. It may be said that the judgment $2 + 2 = 4$ is true even if two things do not and have not anywhere existed and the truth of such judgments can not be constituted by any one's thinking them. For if they were made true by being thought, they might be false, since thought is as likely to be false as true. The latter objection rests again on the confusion of judgment as a cognitive and over-individual act of reference to reality and propositions as mere psychical existents. To judge that $2 + 2 = 4$ is to mean that the real world is so constituted that whenever a rational mind performs the operation of adding two things to two things the result will be four, and the assertion that this judgment is true whether there are really in the world any minds to think four things derives its specious force from failure to observe that the bare symbols mean and refer to actual operations of thought in

counting. Merely to think of two things is at least to assert the universal operation of thought meant by the figure 2. Without this minimum of reference the statement $2 + 2 = 4$ is meaningless. Either the truths of mathematics and logic are principles of actual thinking or they are material entities. The latter supposition is meaningless. The former means that the principles of logic and pure mathematics are expressive of universal conditions of valid thinking in normal minds. If one's thought is to be normal and have a place in that consistent or systematic whole by which alone thought can validly mean reality, one must follow the condition of this common or over-individual thought-structure.

The reality of abstract truths, then, is a thought-reality, but not a mere psychological existence. Like all actual judgments, the judgments of mathematics are logical acts which transcend psychological existence and take their places in an organic and self-consistent system, which latter is the determining ideal that is, at least in part, actualized in the body of science. And the simplest hypothesis on which to ground the validity of this ideal system and by which to account for the common or over-individual thought-structure involved in all judgment will perhaps, after all, prove to be that of a general thinking consciousness. I do not advance this doctrine as the inevitable outcome of reflection on the basis of judgment, but simply to insist that it is a theory seriously to be reckoned with.

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SOCIETIES

SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

AT a meeting held in conjunction with the New York Section of the American Psychological Association, on the afternoon and evening of November 27, 1905, with Professor Woodbridge in the chair, Professor Robert MacDougall was elected Chairman for the coming year and Professor R. S. Woodworth Secretary. The following are abstracts of the papers read:

Smell Discrimination of Two Hundred and Fifty-five Students:
WILL S. MONROE.

Students were provided with sets of small phials filled one third full of common odors,—chiefly essential oils. Each set contained